The outbreak of war in Korea in 1950 quickly brought the realization that although
the Fifth Air Force and the Far Eastern Air Forces (FEAF) had tactical air units
available, it had no tactical air control elements. The United States Air Force
(USAF) possessed only one tactical air control group, the 502nd at Pope AFB,
North Carolina. Movement of this unit to the Korean theater of operations was
requested by FEAF on 28 July, 1950.
Also requested at the same time were three detachments equipped with electronic
ground-directed bombing equipment from the 3903rd Radar Bomb Scoring (RBS) Squadron.
These elements began moving in August, 1950.
Arriving in Korea in September, these three units, designated as Detachments
C, K, and N, were attached to the 502nd Tactical Control Group (Tac Con Grp)
which by now had established a presence in Korea. These RBS units were tasked
with ground-directed bombing of enemy units.
The equipment the detachments possessed was van-mounted radar and control units.
The radars were slightly modified SCR-584 types that had been developed as gun-laying
radar in World War II. The control vans contained various analog computers and
a plotting surface centrally located that allowed radar data to be displayed
in reference to an aircraft’s movement over the ground. A map could be
affixed, and an inking system drew a line that corresponded to the aircraft’s
movement. With this system, the units could direct an aircraft to the coordinates
of a selected target and give bombing instructions. Officially, the equipment
bore the military nomenclature MPQ-2.
Detachments C and K moved northward and established positions at Pyongyang,
North Korea in November. Here, they directed bombing mission against troop concentrations.
When the Chinese forces intervened, and the United Nations forces were compelled
to retreat, Detachments C and K moved south to Taegu in January, 1951. Here,
they were joined by Detachment N from Pusan.
Detachments C, K, and N were redesignated as Detachments 11, 5, and 22, respectively,
with one being assigned to the G/3 (Air-Ground) section of each Army Corps operating
in Korea. In keeping with the chain of administrative control, and to separate
them from the three Aircraft Control and Warning (AC&W) squadrons now operating
in the 502nd Tac Con Grp, they were designated as Tactical Air Direction Post
(TADP), from whence came the sobriquet “Tadpole.”
There is a minor controversy in the explanation of how these units acquired
the name “Tadpole.” Military men have always sought to reduce acronyms
to speakable words. In this desire for clarity, “GP” became “Jeep.”
A common recipient of this action was early radar equipment for which the TPS-type
radars were spoken of as “Tipsy” and CPS-types were acknowledged
as “Cepus.” Equipment later used by Tadpoles, the MSQ series, bore
the designation “Mis-Cue.”
The initials TADP only would seem to be a natural for this process. However,
there are claims that the detachments were spoken of in communiqués and
messages as being “Operating Locations.” In this case, the designation
would be TADP (OL.) What would follow seems only natural. Regardless of the
origin of the name, personnel at these bomb-directing units proudly claimed
the name of Tadpoles.
At the same time the 3903rd RBS sent the detachments, the 1st Shoran Beacon
Squadron sent a unit to Korea. The use of Short Range Navigation (Shoran) had
enabled bombers and photographic planes to be directed to targets in Italy during
World War II. However, the results in Korea were far from satisfactory. The
war planners gave all ground-directed bombing missions to the Tadpoles.
By March, 1951, the Tadpoles were conducting night bombing raids against enemy
positions using mostly B-29 aircraft. In addition, the three detachments moved
north behind advancing troops, placing themselves closer to the front lines
and enabling wider use of their capabilities in directing tactical air. One
of these units, Detachment 11 (radio call sign “Hillbilly”) took
up a position across the Imjin River, north of Seoul. Detachment 5 (“Beverage”)
was placed near Chunchon while Detachment 22 (“Chestnut”) was east
of Wonsan.
In a typical mission, the aircraft would be directed by one of the three major
radar sites into a specified area, where the MPQ-2 equipment would lock-on with
its automatic tracking radar. The assistant controller would make radio contact
with the aircraft and after authenticating with the code of the day, obtain
bomb load, fusing, altitude, air speed, and wind aloft information. These factors
were used to determine which of several pre-selected targets best suited the
ordnance carried by the aircraft.
From a list of targets furnished by the G-3 section and pre-selected targets
designated on the plotting board, the controller selected the target. Utilizing
information received from the aircraft, the attack was planned. Bomb tables
containing release factors were consulted, and a release distance was calculated.
The target was plotted on the board, the release distance set in, and the controller
then would guide the aircraft to the pre-determined point by radio commands.
When the aircraft was on the proper heading and at the proper distance, a count-down
was used to release the bombs. Any strike information such as secondary explosions
or fires were relayed to the Tadpole which logged all aspects of the mission
and reported them to various headquarter units the next day.
By July, the 3903rd RBS personnel were in the process of being recalled to the
United States. The Tadpoles now came under the command of the three AC&W
Squadrons and were partially manned by personnel from these units. The 606th
AC&W Sqdn took “Beverage,” the 607th took “Chestnut,”
and the 6132nd as the newly-designated 608th took control of “Hillbilly.”
Also, by October, new equipment designated MSQ-1 was brought in, and most detachments
now had double capability. The MSQ-1 utilized a highly modified SCR-584 type
radar, but the control van had a new design. The plotting board was now vertical
and encased in a desk-type piece of equipment with analog computers in sealed
units on each side. In addition, a bank of ground to air radios and recording
equipment was placed in the van.
However, the MSQ-1 required more elaborate set-up procedures for a mission than
did the MPQ-2. Maintenance and calibration procedures were different, so maintenance
and control personnel had to adjust to these conditions. In November, the controller
at “Hillbilly,” while setting up target coordinates, did not properly
complete the routine. As a result, the B-29 under control was vectored wrong
and dropped its bomb load on the detachment. Fortunately, only slight damage
was done to equipment, and no personnel were injured.
In February, 1952, “Beverage” sent its MPQ-2 north to the vicinity
of Kumwha, leaving the MSQ-1 in position at Chunchon. The position at Kumwha
became active in late February, and by March was fully involved in close support
missions.
With ground-directed bombing firmly established, a controversy arose between
air and ground officers as to the proper targets. Combat units wanted close
air support, day or night, down to hitting individual artillery positions. Air
officers insisted the better use of the system was against troop concentrations
and supply depots. An examination of surveillance and photographic missions
showed the Circular Error Probable (CEP) or the smallest circle likely to be
hit accurately was approximately 1200 feet with B-26 aircraft and 1300 feet
with B-29s. There was an agreement between Army and USAF headquarters that the
MPQ-2 and MSQ-1 missions would be directed against large concentrations such
as marshalling yards, supply depots, and troop staging areas. Highway and railway
bridges, a favorite target in the opening campaigns, were virtually non-existent
at this time.
By May, two new MSQ-1 units with trained officer s were supporting air operations
for I and X Corps. The new computer system was faster and more accurate than
that used by the MPQ-2. As the theater of operations moved north, the mountainous
terrain had a diminishing effect on the range of the radars. However, due to
placement near the front lines, the accuracy of the system was still evident.
After June, weather conditions mandated use of the Tadpoles in a close support
role. During the months of June and July, with cloud conditions prohibiting
free air assaults, the three detachments controlled more than 2,000 bombing
runs against enemy front line positions, dropping a combined 4,000 tons of bombs
from both B-26 and B-29 aircraft in mostly night missions.
With the war becoming a static front fight, and peace negotiations dragging
on, the Tadpoles continued to do the job they were called upon to do. By the
cessation of hostilities in June, 1953, the Tadpoles had proven the value of
ground-directed bombing. Regardless of the equipment used, or the units which
manned them, the Tadpoles wrote their own chapter in the book of the Korean
War.
Note: The author was a “Tadpole”, serving in radar maintenance
and as assistant controller at “Hillbilly” from 1 Sept – 4
Dec, 1951. He then served at “Beverage”, serving at Chunchon and
then at Kumwha until May, 1952 when he returned to the U.S. after an extended
tour that included duty with the 6132nd AC&W Squadron, detached service
to 7th Infantry Division G-3 as a forward air controller, and subsequent service
as a “Tadpole.”